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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to provide state decision makers with a method 
of making rapid decisions to protect the public from radiation exposures in the event 
of large scale releases of radioactive material from fixed nuclear installations. A vast 
majority of the individuals responsible for the well being of the population during a 
nuclear event do not have adequate knowledge of radiation and radioactive materials. 
This thesis is intended to provide pertinent information that will enable them to make 
rapid informed decisions concerning which protective measures should be implemented 
for the protection of the public. This will be accomplished by showing how relocation 
areas and food control areas are established using field team measurements. This 
thesis will also present calculated exposure rates from two accident scenarios at the 
Hanford Nuclear Site. The first accident scenario is from the Washington Public 
Power Supply Systems Nuclear Plant Number 2 (WNP-2) which is a commercial 
power plant. The second scenario involves the waste tanks located on the Hanford 
Site which are a byproduct of nuclear weapons production. Current emergency 
response planning is for releases of iodine from nuclear facilities. There is no 
emergency response based on releases of cesium, strontium, or plutonium. Concern 
over the possibility of releases from the Hanford tank farm increased after a release 
from a similar facility in the Soviet Union in 1993. 2 
1.2 Civil Response in US 
The purpose of civil response is to prevent the public from being exposed  to 
radioactive materials as the result of a nuclear incident, excluding nuclear war.  If 
there is a nuclear accident in the US, the owner of the facility uses a location 
designated as the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) to collect and distribute 
information related to the event. This information includes the amount of radioactive 
materials released from the plant, the location of the radioactive material in the 
environment as well as the location and status of emergency support groups. The 
information along with recommendations is given to the political decision maker who 
is located at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The decision maker, 
who is usually the state governor, uses the information to assist in deciding which 
protective action recommendations to implement in order to minimize exposure to the 
public as well as emergency personnel. This involves identifying areas of potential 
hazards, and in conjunction with local authorities, define areas to which the 
population can return, areas where people must be relocated, and areas where food 
control procedures must be implemented. The role of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in this process is to provide assets and technical advice to the local 
decision makers. The reason this chain of decision making authority and information 
transfer is necessary is best illustrated by examining the sequence of events which 
occurred during the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. 3 
1.3 The TMI Event 
The main focus of this work is the civil response to an accident at a fixed 
nuclear facility. Examination of the civil response to the March 28, 1979 accident  at 
unit number 2 of TMI is best done by first understanding the actual  sequence of events 
and then looking at the civil reaction to the events.  It will show how uncoordinated 
and confusing the events that took place over the three days of the accident  were. The 
accident began at 03:30 when a clogged resin bed caused water to enter a service air 
line which caused the condensate polishing isolation valve to drift shut. The booster 
pumps then tripped because of loss of suction.  Failure of the booster pumps caused 
the feedwater pumps to shut down and the turbine tripped off line. A pressure 
transient results. The relief vaesults. The relief valve on the pressurizer remains stuck open rele 
coolant water, steam, and radioactive gases into the containment building. At fifteen 
minutes into the accident, the reactor coolant drain tank disk fails which causes the 
pressure to rise in the containment building. The reactor coolant drain tank is used to 
supply and store water from the primary side. The water that drains into the sump 
tank is automatically transferred into the auxiliary building. 
1.3.1 Wednesday March 28, 1979 
In the auxiliary building technicians noticed that the auxiliary sump was 
overflowing and a sample from the main feedwater line had a dose rate reading of 600 
mrem/hr. At 06:40 a site emergency was declared. For the next half hour radiation 4 
levels in the containment building continued to rise.  At three hours and thirty minutes 
(07:02) a general emergency was declared. This identifies the possibility of offsite 
radiological danger. The first step in the procedure following declaration of a general 
emergency is to notify the general public. According to the procedures at the TMI 
plant the following individuals and organizations are to be contacted [1]: 
1.	  The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Emergency Management Authority 
(PEMA) 
2.	  The region I office of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which is 
located in King of Prussia Pennsylvania 
3.	  The licensee, Metropolitan Edison's (Met Ed) President 
4.	  The operator, GPU's President and Vice-President 
5.	  The Met Ed public information office. 
At 07:02 the following people and agencies were contacted. The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Emergency Management Authority (PEMA). PEMA 
in turn contacted the State Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) and the civil defense 
councils of Dauphin and Lancaster counties. Lancaster county authorities then 
contacted the York County civil defense office. The office of the Radiological 
Assistance Program (RAP) of the Department of Energy (DOE) at the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory was also contacted. A line between the control room and the 
BRP office in Harrisburg is established. The governor was notified. The NRC 
notification took over half an hour since there was no one at the Region I office in 
King of Prussia. 5 
At 07:45 Met Ed relays to BRP that there appeared to be enough radioactive 
gas in the containment building to produce a serious offsite release. BRP relayed the 
message to PEMA for preparation for possible evacuation of Goldboro and nearby 
Brunner islands. PEMA then relays this message to the York County authorities. 
Field teams are dispersed to take downwind measurements. One half hour later,  the 
field team radiation level measurements are available and they show no significant 
releases. BRP cancels their advice for evacuation preparations. 
The radiation readings inside of containment increased from 200 R/hr to 6000 
R/hr in approximately one hour (from 07:52 to 08:52). This led to the assumption that 
there was some core damage and radioactive materials were being released to 
containment. This caused concern in the control room pertaining to inhalation of 
airborne nuclides possibly in the ventilation system.  It was therefore required,  at 
11:00 hours, for all personnel in the control room to wear respirators. This action 
fragments the emergency operations facility. Those individuals who cannot get into 
the unit-2 control room, because of lack of respirators,  set up a secondary command 
post in the control room of the adjacent unit number 1.  Beginning at 11:30, an effort 
to cool the steam generators enough to establish convection flow on the primary 
coolant side was made by discharging steam from the secondary side of the steam 
generators into the atmosphere. This was done in an effort to cool the steam 
generators enough to establish convection flow on the primary coolant system side. 
The discharge was a roaring jet of steam that rushed up the side of the containment 
building. The Met Ed president who was on the east shore across from the plant saw 6 
the discharge and had it stopped because of his concern that the steam may have been 
slightly radioactive. The discharge was also stopped because it was very noticeable 
and may cause unnecessary concern. Stopping this discharge deprived the plant of a 
potential path that existed for the removal of heat from the primary  system. 
The Lt. Governor wanted a briefing of the plants' status for the governor's 
office. The two most senior utility decision makers left the site for two and half hours 
to brief the governor's office. 
At 19:50, the operators put one of the two main coolant  pumps into normal 
operation. This placed the reactor into a forced cooling mode and ended the major 
phase of the accident. 
1.3.2 Thursday March 29, 1979 
Day two of the TMI accident had the first releases of radioactive materials 
from the facility. At 04:30 the makeup tank pressure was high due to accumulation of 
radioactive and hydrogen gases.  In order to alleviate the problem gas was vented from 
the tank for short periods through the vent header. The operators later become  aware 
that the vent header leaks and radioactive gases are released through the auxiliary 
building exhaust system out to the atmosphere. A reading at fifteen feet above the 
stack was 3000 mR/hr. The Lt. Governor contacts the NRC in Washington asking 
whether it would be wise to advise school children to stay indoors in the Goldsboro 
area. The NRC responds by saying the radiation levels are well below EPA 
guidelines. This was the first time since the accident began that a high-level Federal 7 
official has become involved in the matter of precautionary protective  action measures 
for the public.  Later that day it was determined that the radiation levels did  not 
warrant evacuation. 
By the afternoon 400,000 gallons of water had accumulated in the discharge 
tanks.  Since the tanks were threatening to overflow GPU, deemed it necessary to 
discharge the water into the Susquehanna river and received NRC approval  to do so. 
The BRP was notified of the discharge to the river. Forty thousand gallons  were 
discharged to the river before the Lt. governor stopped the discharge. A short while 
later,  the State Department of Environmental Research was credited with issuing the 
order to continue the discharge with the Lt. Governor's consent. The discharge 
continued. 
At 16:15, a 100 ml sample of primary coolant water was collected. A 1000 
R/hr dose rate was established. This dose rate indicated significant fuel damage 
involving an estimated 10% of the core radioactive inventory. 
Late in the afternoon the NRC returned to business as usual and continued 
working on a report to congress. All five commissioners and eight of the top NRC 
staff officials were at the meeting. 
133 Friday March 30, 1979 
At 06:00 the makeup tank pressure increased to 80 psi. This high pressure 
caused the relief valve to open and all the water from the makeup tank flows into the 
reactor coolant bleed tank.  In order to relieve pressure the operators began venting the 8 
makeup tank. Each venting of the makeup tank results in a release into the auxiliary 
building and through its exhaust system out to the atmosphere. The operators are 
aware of this and make preparations to monitor and cope with the releases. At 07:00 
PEMA and BRP are notified of the venting and of what was termed a planned but 
uncontrolled release. The dose rate measurements from the release were 1200 mR/hr 
at 130 feet above the stack and 14 mR/hr at the site boundary. PEMA was notified by 
the operations supervisor for unit 2,  at 08:40, that the plant had an uncontrolled 
release and that all non-critical personnel may be evacuated. PEMA was also notified 
that they should prepare to evacuate the population downwind of the plant. BRP 
sends field teams out to the area. The NRC misinterprets where the 1200 mR/hr dose 
rate was measured. They believed it was at the site boundary not knowing that the 
dose rate was 130 feet above the stack. Because of this,  at 09:15, the NRC 
recommendation was made to go ahead and evacuate the population out to 10 miles, 
first beginning with the population within 5 miles. PEMA notifies the state civil 
defense agency but does not notify the governors office. When the governor is finally 
informed he countermands the evacuation order. At 09:45 the BRP completed its 
checks with the NRC on site and was convinced that evacuation was not necessary.  It 
was decided that the most the population should do was to stay inside during the 
morning hours. At 10:25 the governor announces "by NRC advice,  I am advising 
pregnant women and pre-school age children to leave the area within a five mile 
radius of the TMI facility until further notice.  School closures in this area are 
recommended"[I]. This segment of the population was selected because they are the 9 
most sensitive to radiation exposure.  It was later determined that the day's releases 
had a dose rate of 1 to 20 mR/hr on site and there was no threat to the public. 
1.3.4 Results of TMI 
As a result of the accident at TMI it was established that the deficiencies in 
commercial reactor safety were not hardware problems, they were management 
problems. TMI showed how unprepared the nuclear  power industry was for an 
accident. Agencies that were suppose to be contacted had no one to handle incoming 
calls. The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was fragmented between the unit 
and unit 2 control rooms making communication difficult. Unnecessary 
recommendations for protective actions were made by a number of different agencies 
which did not confirm their sources. TMI illustrated how the reactor industry had 
ignored critical areas of operator training, human factors engineering,  utility 
management, and technical qualifications.  It was also found that before March 28, 
1979 there was a complacency within both the utility and the NRC. Following TMI 
there were a number of changes made in the civil response to nuclear power plant 
accidents in the United States. 
1.4 Post TMI US Civil Response to Nuclear Power Plant Accidents 
The lessons of TMI were that the response to a nuclear plant emergency may 
be of short duration with no off-site response actions necessary, or could require an 
1 10 
off-site response that is time consuming, comprehensive, and complex.  The latter 
type of response would require many different actions and large numbers of personnel 
from local,  state, and federal agencies as well as volunteers and the general public. 
Current emergency planning requires the pre-establishment of EOF and EOC locations, 
emergency planning zones and emergency classification levels. 
1.4.1 Emergency Planning Zones 
Current federal guides specify two planning zones. The first emergency 
planning zone is the plume exposure zone and the second zone is the ingestion 
exposure zone [2]. 
The plume exposure emergency planning zone is the area enclosed within a ten 
mile radius of the nuclear plant. The major concern within this  zone is the airborne 
release of radioactive material which may pose a threat to individuals who  come in 
contact with it.  The contact may be external or internal.  External contact is caused 
by the radiation given off by the plume and by individuals walking through areas of 
ground deposition.  Internal contact is caused by the inhalation of radioactive materials 
from the plume. 
The ingestion exposure emergency planning zone is the area contained within a 
fifty mile radius of the nuclear plant and includes the plume emergency planning zone. 
The major concern with this zone is the internal deposition of radioactive materials. 
The internal contact is caused by ingestion of food and water that have radioactive 
material in them and/or inhalation of resuspended radioactive materials. The 11 
resuspended radioactive materials are caused by being blown or kicked up and are 
again suspended in the air. A lesser concern is external  contact caused by direct 
contact, such as walking through a ground deposition area. 
1.4.2 Emergency Classification Levels 121 
There are four emergency classification response levels for a nuclear facility. 
The four classifications are an unusual event,  alert,  site area emergency, and a 
general emergency. 
An unusual event is an event that may cause a reduction in the level of safety 
at a nuclear plant. This type of event does not involve any release of radioactive 
materials to the environment and does not require off-site response or monitoring. 
An alert is an abnormal plant condition that may potentially release radioactive 
materials to the environment. The state and county officials are notified. There are no 
actions required of the public. 
A site area emergency is an abnormal condition with a threat of a release of 
radioactive material to the environment. The state and county officials will be 
notified. The public will also be notified of a site emergency. There are no actions 
required of the general public. 12 
A general emergency is an event which is in progress, or has occurred, and 
has had an actual release, or a threatened release,  to the environment. The state and 
local officials are notified. The population at risk of exposure is immediately notified. 
The public within the emergency planning zones, especially those in potentially 
dangerous areas,  will be advised to take some protective action. 
1.5 Hanford Pu/StiCs Source Term 
The source term used for the Hanford tank problem presents an entirely 
different problem than that for nuclear power plant accidents. In power plant accidents 
iodine is the predominant radionuclide in the source term. Iodine is not used as a 
source term for the Hanford tanks because it is no longer present except for very small 
quantities. The radioactive materials of major concern in the Hanford tanks  are 
cesium, strontium, and plutonium because they have half lives that are many years in 
length [3].  At the time of the writing of this thesis, sampling is being performed on 
the tanks at the Hanford site to determine radioactive material composition of the 
wastes in the tanks. The following assumptions are made for the source term of the 
Hanford tanks. 
1.	  The total inventory of the tanks is based on those estimates found in TRAC­
0151-VA [3]. 
2.	  The inventory is divided equally among the 177 tanks. 13 
1.6 Tomsk Release 
On April 6,  1993 at a military site sixteen kilometers north of the city of 
Tomsk there was a release of radioactive material to the surrounding environment. 
The purpose of the Tomsk site was to produce weapons grade plutonium for the  Soviet 
Unions nuclear armaments. The accident occurred at  one of the PUREX type 
reprocessing plants where fuel, from the plutonium production reactors,  is cut into 
pieces and dissolved in nitric acid. Most of the fission products, particularity cesium 
and strontium, are separated from the solution through the addition of an organic 
solvent. Traces of other materials such as zirconium, niobium, and ruthenium remain 
in the mixture. To remove them, nitric acid is added to the solution. There is a 
danger at this point in that the acid can explosively react with a thin organic layer on 
the surface. To avoid this, compressed air is used to mix the solution to prevent the 
formation of the organic layer. On this day the compressed air was not used/or not 
used adequately enough, and the result was an explosion that blew apart sections of 
the roof and wall of the building. 
There were two releases from this accident. The first release was through the 
hole created by the collapsed wall. This release contaminated an area approximately 
1500 m2. The second release was in the form of gas and dust which passed through 
the ventilation system and out the stack. This release contaminated an area 
approximately 200 km' where the measured dose rate was 19 prem/hr [4]. The area 
that was contaminated was located northeast of the Tomsk site and included a village, 
Georgievka which had a population of approximately 200. The dose rate in 14 
Georgievka was measured to be between 18-45 1..trem/hr in mid-April. The highest 
measured dose rate from the release was 3000 .trem/hr which was located on the 
facility site.  Seventy percent of the activity released was in the form of short lived 
isotopes. These isotopes included 95Nb and I°6Ru. The beta-gamma radionuclide 
release was estimated at 7.5%. If the amount of plutonium released was in the same 
ratio then 23 kg of plutonium was released to the environment. 
According to the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy there was no need to 
evacuate the population of the town since radiation levels were only slightly above 
background [51 Remediation procedures, which involved removal of contaminated 
snow and washing down contaminated areas, proceeded following the accident. 
The United States has a number of military sites similar to the one found near 
Tomsk. The site of major concern in this thesis is the Hanford Site which is located 
in Eastern Washington State. 15 
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Emergency Response to Nuclear Events in the Pacific Northwest 
The states of Oregon and Washington have agreed to act in conjunction when 
decisions are made concerning response actions to nuclear events. This is 
accomplished in uniformity of data flow from the Emergency Operations Centers 
(EOC) to the Governors of the two states. The Emergency Operation Center is the 
location where all pertinent information is assembled and distributed on a need to 
know basis.  This information is then used by the Governor of the state to make 
emergency evacuation decisions. 
2.2 The Trojan Report 
The State of Oregon has developed a new method which allows the states to 
make prompt decisions where food control actions need to be taken while waiting for 
laboratory analysis and aerial monitoring results [1].  This method allows the state to 
quickly identify and hold potentially contaminated foods before analysis is completed. 
This method also allows normal operations to continue in areas where there is little 
likelihood of contamination. 17 
2.3 Phases of Nuclear Accident 
The responses to a nuclear incident in the United States are classified into three 
phases:  early, intermediate, and late phases [2].  There is no definite time table for 
each of the phases but they provide a useful outline for decisions in  emergency 
response. 
The early phase is the time period where the incident is in progress and 
decisions are based on the current conditions of the nuclear facility and on the 
predictions for worsening conditions. Decisions are also made on actual 
environmental measurements when they are available. Evacuation and sheltering  are 
the primary emergency actions used during the early phase. These actions  are 
performed to prevent the public from having direct  exposure to radiation from both 
external and source radiation inhalation. The early phase may last as short as a few 
hours or as long as a few days. The early phase is described as the period from the 
beginning of the accident to the period where the plant is under control and any 
releases of radioactive material have ended. This phase is also referred to as the 
emergency phase. 
The intermediate phase is the period where the incident and all releases have 
been brought under control [2].  Reliable environmental measurements are used to 
make any additional decisions on public concerns. There are two types of protective 
actions used during the intermediate phase. The first protective action is relocation 
and decontamination to protect the public from external and inhalation of radioactive 
source materials. The decision also has to be made whether to decontaminate and 18 
reoccupy contaminated areas or condemn them. The second protective action is to 
place restrictions on the use of contaminated food and water. The intermediate phase 
begins when the emergency at the plant has ended. Protective actions that are taken 
within the plume emergency planning zone continue or,  if deemed necessary, are 
implemented. Protective actions may also be taken in the ingestion emergency 
planning zone. The intermediate phase may last anywhere from  a few weeks to a 
many months. This phase is also referred to the reentry phase. 
The late phase is where recovery actions take place to reduce the radiation 
levels in the environment to acceptable levels [2]. The recovery phase begins when 
protective actions in the plume and ingestion emergency planning zones are ended. 
This phase may begin and end at different times in different areas due to deposition of 
radioactive materials,  its location, the type of radioactive materials, and the quantity 
present. The recovery phase may overlap the reentry phase. Acceptable radiation 
levels allow unrestricted access to the area. The late phase may last from a few 
months to a number of years. 
2.4 Field Team 
In the event of a nuclear related accident at the Washington Nuclear Plant 
Number 2 (WNP-2), or a release from one of the 177 waste tanks located at the 
Hanford site,  exposure rate measurements will be made at a height of 1-meter above 
the ground and the data will be used to help establish geographic areas for which 
protective measures will be taken. These areas are defined as the restricted, 19 
relocation, and the food control areas. These decisions are made while waiting for 
laboratory analysis and aerial monitoring results. This method consists of a field crew 
measuring exposure rates at one meter to help establish contamination levels  for that 
area. The field crew also takes soil/plant samples which are analyzed in a laboratory. 
The one meter exposure rate will determine if the area is contaminated at levels 
greater than/or near the federal response level for protective action guides (PAGs). 
This measured dose rate will also help establish temporary food control area 
parameters until the soil/plant samples can be analyzed and a very accurate dose rate 
can be established. 
When the following conditions are met, field teams begin collecting 1-meter 
exposure rates [1]: 
1.  plant conditions are stabilized and no further release is predicted, 
2.  the plume has dispersed and can no longer be tracked, and 
3.  early phase sheltering and/or evacuation have been completed. 
The data measurements are collected quickly so the time required to develop 
the relocation area and food control areas is minimized. As laboratory analysis and 
aerial monitoring are completed, the boundaries can be adjusted as needed. 
2.5 Relocation Area 
The relocation area is an area with controlled access from which the population 
has to be relocated in order to prevent chronic exposure to radiation [2]. The 
relocation area consists of an area where the radioactive exposure rate, due to ground 20 
deposition of radioactive materials, could exceed the EPA intermediate phase PAG for 
the first year exposure of 2 rem. The 2 rem dose is  a projected sum of the dose 
equivalent from external gamma radiation and the committed effective dose equivalent 
from inhalation of resuspended radionuclides [2]. The boundary is first established 
along a 1-meter exposure dose rate line of 500 pR/hr. The 500 µR/hr exposure rate 
represents a first year integrated dose which is less than the EPA relocation PAG [1]. 
This value is easily measured since it is well above background levels. The exposure 
rate is measured within the first 24 hours following the event. The following 
assumptions are used for creation of the relocation area: 
1.	  the isotopic mix remains uniformally constant and is independent of the 
physical/chemical form of the isotopes, 
2.	  the exposure is from an infinite, uniformally contaminated ground  source and 
occurs at a height of 1-meter above the ground, 
3.	  beta exposures to the skin, ingestion of dirt, and inhalation are considered 
insignificant and are therefore neglected, 
4.	  the exposure due to food and water ingestion is considered independently and 
is therefore neglected, 
5.	  the ratio of effective dose to air exposure is 0.7 and 
6.	  the effective dose is reduced due to natural decay. Shielding from homes or 
other structures is not considered. 21 
2.6 Food Control Area 
The food control area is an area which surrounds the relocation area and within 
which food control measures are taken [2]. The food control  area surrounds the area 
where the 1311 deposition could exceed the FDA response level of 0.13 pCi/m2 for the 
WNP-2 scenario [3].  The FDA response level for the Hanford tanks is a deposition 
of 137Cs with a concentration of 3.0 pCi/m2 and/or a deposition of 'Sr with  a 
concentration of 0.5 plCi/m2 [3].  Protective actions are taken for the following foods: 
milk,  fruits,  vegetables, grains, meats, and other food stuffs. For milk the 
protective action necessary is to hold the milk to allow the short lived isotopes to 
decay away. For fruits and vegetables the protective action is to wash, brush,  or 
scrubbing to remove surface contamination. For grains milling and polishing are done 
to remove surface contamination. For meat and meat products, intake of 137Cs uptake 
by the meat pathway may exceed that for milk. If the cesium level in the milk is 
approaching the response level then protective actions should be implemented for 
meat. The boundary is initially established using a theoretical dose rate line 
representing an equivalent 1-meter exposure rate of 2 p.R/hr [1].  This exposure rate, 
which is valid for the first 24 hours of decay, indicates an 131I activity concentration 
less than the FDA response level. The 2 1.11t/hr exposure rate is a first year integrated 
dose rate for an 1311 activity concentration less than the FDA response level. The 
assumptions used in creation of the food control area are: 
I.	  the plume, and ground deposition of the plume, are iodine dominated for the 
WNP-2 scenario and the Hanford tanks deposition is dominated by "'Cs and 
'Sr, 22 
2.	  100% of the short term gamma ray dose rate at 1-meter is from radioiodine  for 
the WNP-2 scenario and is 137Cs-I37ilBa dominated for the Hanford scenario, 
3.	  the radioiodine isotopic deposition mix is proportional to the radioiodine core 
inventory ratios for the WNP-2 scenario and the isotopic deposition mix for the 
Hanford tanks is proportional to the tank inventory, 
4.	  the radioiodine isotopic deposition mix remains uniformally constant and is 
independent of the physical/chemical forms of the iodine for the WNP-2  case 
and the deposition mix is uniformally constant and independent of 
physical/chemical forms from the Hanford tanks, 
5.	  the exposure is from an infinite uniformally contaminated ground surface and is 
assumed to occur at a height of 1-meter above the ground and 
6.	  the ratio of effective dose to air exposure is 0.7. 
2.7 Food Control Area Boundary 
Since a dose rate of 2 pR/hr is below natural background levels it cannot be 
directly measured. Instead a 20 pR/hr dose rate line is developed from field team 
measurements. This is used in conjunction with the 500 pR/hr line to extrapolate to a 
2 pR/hr dose rate line. The 20 pR/hr measurement is approximately 2 to 3 times that 
of background and is readily measured. 
The assumptions used in creation of the food control area are [3]: 
1.	  the dose rate is from ground exposure only, 
2.	  deposition is uniform and proportional to the isotopic concentration in the 
plume, 
3.	  wind stability is unknown or varied over time of release and 
4.	  off centerline scaling methods are reasonable and conservative 23 
The relationship between the measured dose rates of 500 pRihr and 20 AR/hr at 
known distances from the release point is shown below: 
uR  uR  dcnn X  (2-1) 20  = 500 -r--- ( hr  hr  d20 
where 
d500 = distance from source to 500 1.111/hr dose rate line 
d20  distance from source to 20 µR/hr dose rate line and 
X = atmosphere (wind) stability factor. 
Wind stability is unknown, so the X value in the above equation is unknown. 
The wind stability can be calculated by solving eq. 2-1 for X and using measured 
field team data to calculate a site specific value for X. The following equation shows 
how the wind stability factor is calculated: 
In (50) = ln( ( 
500 
) x)
50 
ln(3 0) =X  dsoo )
50  (.120 
in (2-- ) 
X  5000  (2-2) 
J) 
d20 
To calculate the 2 µR/hr dose rate line, use eq. 2-1. Evaluate at a distance,  d2, the 
distance from the source to the 2 µR/hr exposure rate line. 24 
uR d  x 2 -1! = 500-r--- (  5") hr  hr d2 
d2 = distance from source to theoretical 2 1.111/hr dose rate point 
Solve for the d2 value. 
dcriL n 2  (...j2)X, 
500  d2 
1 A 
2  % r  `4500 
500 
=  d 2 ' 
d500
d2 = 
2 1r %-i
1
500 
Hence, an expression relating the distance between the food control boundary 
to the source as a function of distance to the relocation boundary and the atmospheric 
wind stability factor, X. 
2  -1 -1  (2-3)
d2  d500  ( -120 ) 
The above equations are based on measured data and do not allow for the decay of 
radioisotopes due to time delay of data collection. 25 
1 
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3.0 APPLICATION TO WNP-2 
WNP-2 is a 1100 MWe nuclear power plant designed by General Electric[1]. 
It is located on the Hanford site approximately 10 miles north of Richland, 
Washington and 40 miles north of the Oregon border. 
3.1 Radioiodine Calculations for the WNP-2 Core 
The calculations done in this section are necessary in finding the isotopic 
concentration for the radioiodine isotopes in the WNP-2 core. A ground deposition 
value of 0.13 Ki/m2 of "'I at the initial time of the release is assumed since this is 
the contamination rate at which protective actions are implemented [3]. The results 
from these calculations are used to calculate the 1-meter exposure rates for the 
different isotopes of radioiodine. The 1-meter exposure rates are calculated for the 
first 96 hours following a release to show exposure rates over time that meet the 0.13 
p,Ci/m2 protective action guide limits. 
The core inventory of iodine at WNP-2 is calculated from data found in the 
WNP-2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [2].  Section 15 of the WNP-2 FSAR 
outlines the assumptions for the design basis accident which could result in a large 
scale release of radioactive material. The assumptions made in this calculation are: 
1.  reactor fuel has an irradiation time of 1000 days 
2.  0.32% of halogen activity is in the fuel rod plenum 
3.  770 fuel rods are damaged 27 
4.	  the fuel lattice is 8X8 
5.	  764 fuel assemblies make up one core 
6.	  1.4x103 Curies of 131I concentrated in the condenser 
The assumptions governing the deposition in the environment are: 
1.	  The atmospheric release and subsequent deposition is iodine-dominated, 
2.	  Effectively, 100 per cent of short term gamma dose  rate at one meter is from 
radioiodine, 
3.	  The radioiodine isotopic deposition mix is proportional to the radioiodine core 
inventory ratios, 
4.	  The radioiodine isotopic deposition mix remains uniformally constant and is 
independent of the physical/chemical forms of iodine, 
5.	  The exposure is from an infinite,  uniformally contaminated ground surface 
and is assumed to occur at a height of one meter above the ground, 
6.	  The 1311 area deposition equals 0.13 Ki/m2 [3] and 
7.	  The effective dose rate to exposure ratio is 0.7 [4]. 
In the WNP-2 facility, there are 64 fuel pins per assembly and thus 48896 fuel 
pins in the reactor. 
In order to calculate the amount of 1311 present in the fuel pins of the reactor 
the above assumptions specify that 0.32% of the halogen activity is in the fuel plenum. 
Using this value and the fact that 1,400 curies of 1311 is released from 770 damaged 
fuel pins, the total amount of 1311 present in the 770 fuel pins is the 1400 curies 
divided by the percent of halogen activity in the fuel rod plenum. Thus 437,500 
Curies of 1311 is present in the 770 fuel pins. To solve for the total number of Curies 
of 1311 in the core a ratio is used. The following ratio equation is used to find the total 28 
amount of activity of 1311 in the core: 
4 37 5 0 0 Curies,  X 
77 0 fuel pins  4 8 89 6 fuel pins 
Thus the entire core contains 2.778x107 Curies of "'I. 
13312  134-,, The core inventories for 1321,  and 131 were calculated in the same 
manner. Table 3.1 shows the core inventory of activity concentrations for the iodine 
isotopes in the core of the WNP-2 reactor. The table shows that the isotope with the 
greatest inventory is 
1341  which has an inventory of 7.34x107 Curies. 
Table 3.1  Iodine Isotope Concentrations for WNP-2 
Isotope  Core Inventory 
(Curies) 
2.78E+07 
1321  4.3 7E +07 
133/  6.35E+07 
1341  7.34E+07 
1351  5.75E+07 
The dose rate conversion factor for uniform ground contamination is found in 
NRC documentation and has the units of rem/hr/Ci/m2 [5].  In order to be useful for 
this work the units of the dose rate conversion factor must be converted from 
rem/hr/Ci/m2 to mrem /yr /p.Ci /m2. The conversion is as follows: 
The exposure rate conversion factor is calculated by taking the dose-rate 
conversion factor and multiplying it by the following conversions: 29 
mrem 
yr  ( 1.0E-03 rem)  X(  1.LCi  )  1 year x(  , 
1.,LCi  mrem  1.0E-06 Ci  8.7E+03 hr 
m2 
rem 1.14E-01
 hr 
Ci 
m2 
1000 If  0.163 If­ mR  hr dose-rate cony. x  . days  hr 0.7 x 365.25  x 24 yr  days  m2 
The 0.7 value is the effective dose rate to exposure rate ratio [3]. 
The half-lives, decay constants, dose rate conversions, and exposure rate 
conversions for the WNP-2 iodine isotopes are listed in Table 3.2. Table 3.2 shows 
that the exposure rate conversion for '31 I is 3.30223 pR/hr/p.Ci/m2. This value will be 
used later in the calculations to help determine the 1-meter exposure rate for 131I. 
Table 3.2 Various Parameter for WNP-2 
Exposure-
Dose-Rate  Dose-Rate  Rate 
Decay  Conversion  Conversion  Conversion 
Half-Life  Constant  (rem/hr/  (mrem/yr/  (AR/hr/ 
Isotope  (hours)  (hours-1)  p.Ci/m2)  pCi/m2)  Ki/m2) 
1-131  192.96  0.003591  2.31  20.26  3.30223 
1-132  2.30  0.301030  13.10  114.91  18.72695 
1-133  20.80  0.033317  3.52  30.88  5.03197 
1-134  0.88  0.790194  14.70  128.94  21.01421 
1-135  6.50  0.106615  8.27  72.54  11.82228 30 
The isotopic activity is calculated using the decay equation and has units of Curies. 
The equation is shown below: 
A = Aoe-lt 
where 
A = Activity, 
A. = Initial activity,
 
X = decay constant and
 
t = time.
 
The isotopic activities were calculated for the following time intervals:  0,  12,
 
24,  36, 48, 72, and 96 hours. These time intervals were chosen since they 
represent the time frame in which all field team measurements will be made. Table 
3.3 shows that after 96 hours the dominant isotope is "I The table also shows that 
within the first 96 hours of the release the 1321 and 1341 activity will be virtually  zero. 
The isotopic activities over time for the WNP-2 reactor are listed in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3  Isotopic Activity of Iodine for WNP-2 
Isotope  0 hrs  12 hrs  24 hrs  36 hrs  48 hrs  72 hrs  96 hrs 
1-131  2.8E+07  2.7E+07  2.6E+07  2.4E+07  2.3E+07  2.1E+07  2.0E+07 
1-132  4.4E+07  1.2E+06  3.2E+04  8.5E+02  2.3E+01  1.7E-02  1.2E-05 
1-133  6.4E+07  4.3E+07  2.9E+07  1.9E+07  1.3E+07  5.8E+06  2.6E+06 
1-134  7.3E+07  5.6E+03  4.2E-01  3.3E-05  2.5E-09  1.4E-17  8.3E-26 
1-135  5.8E+07  1.6E+07  4.5E+06  1.2E+06  3.4E+05  2.7E+04  2.1E+03 
Gross  2.7+E08  8.6E+07  5.9E+07  4.5E+08  3.7E+07  2.7E+07  2.2E+07 31 
3.1.1  Isotopic Fraction 
The isotopic fraction of total curies released is used to define which isotopes 
have the largest concentrations. The isotopic fraction is calculated by dividing the 
isotopic activity by the gross activity for that time step. Table 3.4 contains the 
isotopic fractions of the iodine isotopes found in the WNP-2 core. The data shows 
that after 96 hours 88% of the activity from the deposition is caused by 131I  and that 
1321,  1341,  and  351 have such small activity fractions that there is limited contributions 
to the 1-meter exposure rate calculations. 
The radioiodine isotope of major concern in a commercial power plant release 
is 1311  )]  The isotopic concentrations, of the iodine isotopes,  are normalized to 0.13 
1C/m2 of "'I for the WNP-2 calculations [3]. The calculation consists of the isotopic 
activity fraction times the "II concentration divided by the "II activity fraction. The 
results of this calculation are summarized in Table 3.5. The data show that at 96 
hours the largest concentration is "II but for the first 24 hours is the dominant isotope. 
Table 3.4 Isotopic Fraction of Total Curies Released for WNP-2 
Isotope  0 hrs  12 hrs  24 hrs  36 hrs  48 hrs  72 hrs  96 hrs 
1-131  0.10  0.31  0.43  0.55  0.64  0.79  0.88 
1-132  0.16  0.01  5.4E-04  1.9E-05  1.1E-08  7.7E-11  5.4E-13 
1-133  0.24  0.49  0.49  0.43  0.35  0.21  0.12 
1-134  0.27  6.5E-05  7.3E-08  7.2E-13  6.8E-18  5.3E-26  3.7E-33 
1-135  0.22  0.19  0.08  0.03  9.4E-3  9.8E-04  9.4E-06 32 
Table 3.5 Isotopic Concentration Normalized to  an 1-131 Concentration of 0.13 
(pR/m2) for WNP-2 
Isotope  0 hrs  12 hrs  24 hrs  36 hrs  48 hrs  72 hrs  96 hrs 
1-131  0.13  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.1  0.09 
1-132  0.20  5.3E-03  1.5E-04  3.8E-06  1.1E-07  7.7E-11  5.5E-14 
1-133  0.30  0.19  0.13  0.09  0.06  0.03  0.01 
1-134  0.34  2.5E-05  2.0E-09  1.5E-13  1.2E-17  6.7E-26  3.8E-24 
1-135  0.27  0.07  0.02  5.6E-03  1.6E-03  1.2E-04  9.4E-06 
3.1.2 1-Meter Exposure Rates 
The isotopic exposure at one meter is calculated to find what the expected 
exposure rates will be for each isotope of iodine in the event of a release from the 
WNP-2 reactor. The 1-meter exposure rate is calculated by multiplying the isotopic 
concentration by the isotopic exposure rate conversion. Table 3.6 shows the isotopic 
exposure rate for the iodine isotopes in the WNP-2 core. The exposure rate at time 
zero is 16.14 1.1.R/hr and quickly drops to 2.31 AR/hr at twelve hours. The table shows 
that at 96 hours 1311 is the dominant isotope. 
The isotopic exposure rate fraction is used to determine which isotopes 
contribute most to the exposure at specified times following a release and subsequent 
ground deposition. The exposure rate fraction are by taking the isotopic dose rate and 
dividing by the gross dose rate.  "'I has the highest exposure rate fraction at 96 hours. 
The isotope of radioiodine that dominates the exposure rate for the first 12 hours of 
the release is "I. The isotope that dominates from 12-36 hours following the accident 
is "I The isotopic exposure rate fraction for the WNP-2 core is shown in Table 3.7. 33 
Table 3.6 Isotopic Exposure Rate at 1-Meter (RR/hr) from WNP-2 
Isotope  0 hrs  12 hrs  24 hrs  36 hrs  48 hrs  72 hrs  96 hrs 
1-131  0.43  0.40  0.40  0.36  0.36  0.33  0.3 
1-132  3.83  0.10  2.8E-03  7.2E-05  2.0E-06  1.4E-09  1.0E-12 
1-133  1.49  0.97  0.68  0.43  0.30  0.14  0.06 
1-134  7.21  5.3E-04  4.2E-08  3.1E-12  2.4E-16  1.4E-24  8.0E-33 
1-135  3.18  0.85  0.25  0.07  0.02  1.5E-03  1.21E-4 
Gross  16.14  2.31  1.32  0.86  0.67  0.47  0.36 
Table 3.7 Isotopic Exposure Rate Fractions For WNP-2 
Isotope  0 hrs  12 hrs  24 hrs  36 hrs  48 hrs  72 hrs  96 hrs 
1-131  0.03  0.17  0.30  0.42  0.53  0.71  0.83 
1-132  0.24  0.04  2.1E-03  5.4E-05  2.9E-06  3.1E-09  2.9E-12 
1-133  0.09  0.42  0.51  0.33  0.44  0.29  0.17 
1-134  0.45  2.3E-04  3.2E-08  2.3E-12  3.6E-16  3.0E-24  2.2E-32 
1-135  0.20  0.37  0.19  0.05  0.03  3.1E-03  3.1E-4 
3.2 Analysis of Results 
From Tables 3.6 and 3.7 it can be seen that after 96 hours the exposure rate is 
dominated by "II. The 1-meter exposure rate after 24 hours is 1.32 pli./hr which is 
smaller than background. Field team measurements will not be able to differentiate 
this from background if the area is contaminated at the PAG minimum of 0.13 .tCi /m2. 
The contamination levels will have to be determined by laboratory analysis of soil and 
plant samples. Until the analysis is complete, the food control area boundary will be 34 
set up using the methodology described in section 2.7 of this thesis. As laboratory 
analysis is completed the food control boundaries may be adjusted. The 1-meter 
exposure rate at 24 hours for the Trojan report was 2.64 pR/hr [6].  The difference 
between the exposure rate from WNP-2 and Trojan is caused by use of a different 
dose conversion factor. The Trojan report uses a dose conversion factor from the 
while this thesis uses a dose rate conversion factor Department of Energy (DOE), 
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) [4]. The NRC dose rate conversion 
factor is half the DOE dose rate conversion factor. Figure 3-1 shows the exposure rate 
verses time for the iodine isotopes. This figure allows individuals to determine what 
the exposure rate will be for a given time following the release assuming the area has 
a ground deposition which is at the PAG minimum. These levels show at what 1­
meter exposure rate protective actions need to be taken. Figure 3-2 shows the 
exposure rate fractions for the individual isotopes of iodine.  This figure shows that 
for the first two hours of the release 1341 is the leading contributor to the exposure rate. 
For the hours two through twelve 1351 is the dominant isotope. For hours twelve 
"II dominates the exposure rate through forty-four 1331 is the dominant isotope.
 
following forty-four hours after the release.
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4.0 APPLICATION TO HANFORD STORAGE TANKS 
4.1  Site Characteristics 
The US Corp of Engineers selected an area of approximately 600 square miles, 
located in eastern Washington State,  for production of nuclear materials, mainly 
plutonium in support of the US effort in World War II. The Hanford site was chosen 
because it met the criteria established by the Du Pont Company and the US Army 
Corp of Engineers. The site selected had to meet the following criteria [1]: 
a large and remote piece of land, 
no town of 1000 or more population closer than 20 miles, 
no main highway, railroad, or employee village closer than 10 miles 
an abundant clean water supply, 
a large electrical supply and 
ground that could bear heavy loads. 
Since selection of the site in early 1943, nine reactors were built on the site [2]. 
Companion fuel fabrication plants, chemical processing plants, and waste 
management facilities were constructed and operated [2]. The irradiated uranium 
discharged from the reactors was processed to recover uranium and plutonium. This 
recovery process has resulted in the accumulation of a wide variety of radioactive and 
chemical wastes which are stored in 177 waste tanks. 39 
4.2 Release Pathways 
A number of the tanks at the Hanford Site facilities and equipment  at the tank 
farms are 40 to 50 years old and have not been well maintained. The Hanford tank 
farms consist of 177 waste tanks, of which 149  are single-shell tanks (SSTs) and 28 
are double-shell tanks (DSTs) [3].  Approximately sixty-one million gallons (230,000 
m3) of caustic liquids,  slurries,  saltcakes, and sludges have been accumulated in 
these tanks [3]. The SSTs contain mostly solid wastes and the DSTs contain liquid 
and suspended solids [3].  There are a few scenarios which could result in an 
explosive rupture of a tank which would result in a contamination event similar to 
what occurred at Tomsk. 
Currently there are a number of safety issues concerning the waste tanks at the 
Hanford site.  There is a flammable hydrogen gas concentration existing in twenty-five 
SSTs and DSTs. The most serious problem is in tank 241-SY-101 where high levels 
of hydrogen gas are being generated and released. The levels of hydrogen released 
have been high enough that the lower flammability limit was exceeded in the tank 
head space for several minutes prior to being removed by the ventilation system. To 
mitigate the problem a pump was installed to periodically mix the waste to remove the 
hydrogen that was trapped in the sludge. Preliminary results show that the 
concentration of hydrogen gas in the tank head space have been lowered to levels 
below the lower flammability level. 
Another potentially explosive mixture is sodium nickel ferrocyanide and 
sodium nitrate in twenty tanks. At certain concentrations these chemicals are known 40 
to react exothermically at high temperatures. Temperature  measurements and 
computer modelling have shown that the probability for such an occurrence is very 
unlikely. 
There is the potential for an exothermic nitrate-nitrite organic  chemical reaction 
in nine SSTs. These tanks contain organic material, that in certain concentrations, 
may react with nitrate or nitrite under high temperature conditions. The tank of 
greatest concern is 241-C-103. Current analysis is being performed  on the vapor 
space, the organic layer, and the liquid waste in the tank.  Preliminary data indicates 
the waste consists mainly of tributyl phosphate with a small concentration of natural 
paraffin hydrocarbons. The temperature in the tank is well below the flashpoint of 
such a mixture. 
There is a high heat load in SST 241-C-106 requiring periodic addition of 
water to provide evaporative cooling. The liquid cannot be removed from this tank 
because the tank would over heat and potentially damage the structural integrity of the 
tank. 
43 Source Terms 
The source term for the Hanford tanks is more complex then for the WNP-2 
scenario. There are a number of different radioactive isotopes present in the waste 
tanks. The radioactive isotopes of concern in this thesis are cesium, strontium, and 
plutonium. 41 
At the time of the writing of this thesis the yield of plutonium isotopes from 
weapons production is still classified information. For the purpose of the calculations 
that are forth coming in this thesis the concentrations of plutonium yield are from a 
mixed oxide fuel. A mixed oxide fuel is similar to the fuel used in weapons 
production plants. MOX fuel is made up of recycled uranium (UO2)  and plutonium 
[4]. The assumptions for the plutonium isotopic concentrations in the  mixed oxide 
fuel are [5]: 
1.	  The fuel was burned to 33,000 MWD/MTHH 
2.	  The fuel is reprocessed after three years of operation 
3.	  The fuel is stored for two years following reprocessing. 
The plutonium isotope with the largest relative concentration, of 58.3%,  is 
234 -ru. The isotope with the smallest relative concentration, 1.8%,  is 238Pu. The 
relative concentrations of the plutonium isotopes are shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Plutonium Isotope Relative Concentrations 
Isotope	  Percentage (%) 
238Pu  1.8 
239n 
r 1.1	  58.3 
-ru	  23.3 
241pu  11.0 
242,-. ru	  5.6 42 
4.4 Calculations 
The calculations performed in this section are used to find the 1-meter exposure 
rates from a release from the Hanford tanks. The exposure rates for all the isotopes 
are normalized to a 137Cs ground deposition of 3.0 pCi/m2, excluding 9°Sr, which is 
the minimum concentration at which protective actions are implemented. 90Sr has a 
protective action minimum of 0.5 ilCi/m2. The exposure rates are calculated for the 
next fifty years, with the initial start time beginning in 1994. 
The activity concentrations of the isotopes in the Hanford tanks are taken from 
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the disposal of high level and transuranic 
wastes from the Hanford tanks [2]. The isotope with the largest activity concentration 
is 137Cs-137mBa. The 137Cs-137'13a activity concentration is 6.44E+07 curies. The other 
isotopes in the Hanford tanks have much smaller activities than the 137Cs-137"113a. The 
isotopic activities of 137Cs-137mBa,  90Sr,  90Y, and the plutonium isotopes are shown in 
table 4.2. 43 
Table 4.2 Isotopic Activity for the Hanford Tanks 
Isotope  Activity (Curies) 
90Sr  7.31E+05 
9°Y  183.72 
1376-1"mBa  6.44E+07 
238PU  3.17 
239Pu  105.06 
41.98 
241pu  17.16 
242pu  10.09 
The half lives, decay constants, dose rate conversions, and exposure rate 
conversions for the Hanford Tanks are calculated in the same manner as was used in 
the WNP-2 calculations. These values can be found in Table 4.3. 44 
Table 4.3 Various Parameters for the Hanford Waste Tank Isotopes 
Exposure 
Dose Rate  Dose Rate  Rate 
Conversion  Conversion  Conversion 
Half-life  Lambda  (rem/hr/  (mrem/yr/  GAR/he 
Isotope  (years)  (years")  piCi/m2)  Ki/m2)  Ki/m2) 
"Sr  29.1  0.02  0  0  0 
90Y  7.31E-03  94.8  0  0  0 
1"Cs-1"mBa  30.17  0.02  3.49  30.61  4.99 
"813u  87.7  7.90E-03  4.9E-03  0.04  7.0E-03 
239Pu  2.41E+04  2.88E-05  2.16E-03  0.02  3.1E-03 
240Pu  6.56E+03  1.06E-04  4.68E-03  0.04  6.7E-03 
241Pu  14.4  0.05  0  0  0 
242Pu  3.75E+05  1.85E-06  0.03  0.03  5.6E-03 
The isotopic activities for the Hanford tanks were calculated for :  0,  10,  20,  30, 
40, and 50 years since the isotopes of concern have half lives that are many years. 
The isotopic activities are listed in Table 4.4 where 0 years refers to the year 1994. 45 
Table 4.4 Isotopic Activity for Hanford Waste Tanks (Curies) 
Isotope  0 yrs  10 yrs  20 yrs  30 yrs  40 yrs  50 yrs 
9°Sr  7.3E+05  5.8E+05  4.5E+05  3.6E+05  2.8E+05  2.2E+05 
90Y  183.7  144.8  114.1  89.9  70.9  55.9 
"'Cs- 6.4E+07  5.1E+07  4.1E+07  3.2E+07  2.6E+07  2.0E+07 
13713a 
238Pu  3.2  2.9  2.7  2.5  2.3  2.1
 
239pu
  105.1  105.0  105.0  105.0  104.9  104.9 
240Pu  42.0  42.0  42.0  42.0  42.0  42.0
 
241pu
  17.2  10.6  6.6  4.1  2.5  1.5
 
242Pu
 
1 0. 1  1 0. 1  1 0. 1  1 0. 1  1 0. 1  10.1 
Gross  6.5E+07  5.2E+07  4.1E+07  3.3E+07  3.0E+07  2.1E+07 
4.4.1  Isotopic Fractions 
The isotopic fraction of total curies released for the Hanford tanks was 
calculated in the same manner as those calculations performed to find the isotopic 
fractions of the WNP-2 reactor.  137Cs-137mBa has the largest isotopic concentration of 
the isotopes of concern in the Hanford tanks.  137Cs-137mBa makes up 99% of the total 
curies released from the site. The isotopic fractions are shown in table 4.5. 
The isotopic concentration in the Hanford Waste tanks is normalized to a 
uniform ground concentration of 3.0 IACi/m2 of 13'Cs-137113a. "Sr and 90Y are 
normalized to a uniform ground concentration of 0.5 1.1Ci/m2 [6]. These calculations 
are made in the same manner as those done in the WNP-2 analysis. The isotopic 
normalized concentrations are shown in the Table 4.6. 46 
Table 4.5  Isotopic Fractions of Total Curies Released for the Hanford Tanks 
Isotope  0 yrs  10 yrs  20 yrs  30 yrs  40 yrs  50 yrs 
90Sr  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
90Y  2.8E-06  2.8E-06  2.8E-06  2.8E-06  2.7E-07  2.7E_07 
137Cs­ 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
1"mBa 
238Pu  1.5E-07  1.4E-07  1.3E-07  1.2E-07  1.1E-07  9.9E-08 
23Spu  4.9E-06  4.9E-06  4.9E-06  4.9E-06  4.9E-06  4.9E-06 
240pu  2.0E-06  2.0E-06  2.0E-06  2.0E-06  2.0E-06  2.0E-06 
241pu  8.0E-07  5.0E-07  3.1E-07  1.9E-07  1.2E-07  7.2E-08 
242Pu  4.7E-07  4.7E-07  4.7E-07  4.7E-07  4.7E-07  4.7E-07 
Table 4.6 Isotopic Concentration Normalized to Cs-137 Concentration of 3.0 
(pCi/m2) for the Hanford Tanks 
Isotope  0 yrs  10 yrs  20 yrs  30 yrs  40 yrs  50 yrs 
90Sr  0.50  0.39  0.31  0.24  0.19  0.15 
90Y  0.50  0.39  0.31  0.24  0.19  0.15 
137Cs- 3.00  2.38  1.89  1.51  1.12  0.95 
1"mBa 
238Pu  1.48E-07  1.36E-07  1.26E-07  1.16E-07  1.08E-07  9.94E-08 
"Vu  4.89E-06  4.89E-06  4.89E-06  4.89E-06  4.89E-06  4.89E-06 
240Pu  1.96E-06  1.95E-06  1.95E-06  1.95E-06  1.95E-06  1.95E-06 
241Pu  7.99E-07  4.94E-07  3.05E-07  1.89E-07  1.17E-07  7.21E-08 
242Pu  4.70E-07  4.70E-07  4.70E-07  4.70E-07  4.70E-07  4.70E-07 47 
4.4.2 1-Meter Exposure Rates 
The isotopic exposure rate from the Hanford Tanks is calculated in the same 
manner as was used for the WNP-2 scenario. The isotope with the greatest 1-meter 
exposure rate is 137Cs-13713a which has an exposure rate of 14.97 1.1R/hr at 0 years and 
an exposure rate of 4.75 .tR/hr at 50 years. The isotopic 1-meter exposure rates  are 
shown in Table 4.7. 
The isotopic exposure rate fractions for the Hanford Waste tanks are calculated 
in the same manner as was used in the WNP-2 scenario. The isotope with  the greatest 
exposure rate fraction is 137Cs-137n3a which is 1.  The 137Cs-1371"13a isotope accounts for 
approximately 100% of the gamma ray exposure from a Hanford tank release. 
Table 4.7 Isotopic Exposure Rate at 1-Meter for the Hanford Tanks (.1R/hr) 
Isotope  0 yrs  10 yrs  20 yrs  30 yrs  40 yrs  50 yrs 
90Sr  0  0  0  0  0  0 
90Y  0  0  0  0  0  0 
137Cs­ 14.97  11.90  9.45  7.51  5.97  4.75 
137mBa 
238Pu  1.03E-09  9.55E-10  8.83E-10  8.16E-10  7.54E-10  6.96E-10 
239Pu  1.51E-08  1.51E-08  1.51E-08  1.51E-08  1.51E-08  1.51E-08 
240Pu  1.31E-08  1.31E-08  1.31E-08  1.31E-08  1.31E-08  1.31E-08 
241Pu  0  0  0  0  0  0 
242Pu  2.61E-09  2.61E-09  2.61E-09  2.61E-09  2.61E-09  2.61E-09 
Gross  14.97  11.90  9.45  7.51  5.97  4.75 48 
4.5 Analysis of Results 
From Table 4.7 it can be seen that 137Cs-137mBa is the dominant isotope for the 
Hanford tanks exposure rate. These values are easily measured for the first twenty 
years, then following this time laboratory analysis will be necessary to confirm 
contamination. The other isotopes are negligible compared to 137Cs-137mBa. Figure 4.1 
shows the exposure rates verses time for the individual isotopes. The figure shows 
that the exposure rate for 137Cs-137mBa is ten orders of magnitude greater than any of 
the other isotopes. Figure 4.2 shows the exposure rate of 137Cs-137mBa verses time 
which is the dominant isotope for the time period in which these calculations were 
performed. 49 
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5.0 SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter consists of a brief explanation of future plans for the 1-meter 
exposure rate calculations,  as well as a general summary of the WNP-2 and Hanford 
waste tank calculations. 
5.1 Summary 
When TMI occurred the nuclear power industry in the United States was not 
adequately prepared to confront the situation. Following TMI a number of changes 
were made in the management of nuclear accidents. The major changes were pre-
establishment of emergency operations facilities and centers,  as well as specification 
of the plume exposure zone and the ingestion exposure zone. 
The calculations in this thesis provide an approach to addressing immediate 
post-plume concerns. This method is based on measured data.  It does not allow for 
time delay of data collection to significantly delay the development of PARS. 
Agencies are able to make prompt decisions to restrict access to areas of high radiation 
and to identify and hold potentially contaminated food, before sampling results are 
available, without conflicting with federal guidelines. 
Two accident scenarios were calculated. The first was a radioiodine release 
from the WNP-2 nuclear power plant and the second was a cesium, strontium, and 
plutonium release from the waste tanks located on the Hanford site. Ground 
depositions of the gamma emitting isotopes was assumed to be 0.13 .tCi /m2 for 'I 53 
and 3.0 1.1.Ci/m2 for "Ts-wmBa. These values are the minimum level for PAGs  to be 
implemented. In each case a 1-meter exposure rate was calculated from the initial 
time of the event to a time later. The WNP-2 scenario had 1-meter  exposure rates 
calculated for the first 96 hours of the accident because of the short half lifes of the 
isotopes involved. The Hanford tank scenario has the 1-meter exposure rates for the 
next fifty years calculated, beginning in 1994, because of its long half life. 
The 1-meter exposure rate for the WNP-2 scenario is 1.32 Ki/hr. This 
exposure rate is not readily measured, therefore the food control boundary needs to be 
calculated using the methods found in chapter 2 of this thesis. The 1-meter exposure 
rate is different than that calculated for the Trojan nuclear plant because a different 
dose conversion factor was used. 
The 1-meter exposure rate from the Hanford tanks is easily measured for the 
next twenty years. The isotope that dominates the exposure is the wCs-wmBa decay 
chain.  90Sr and the plutonium isotopes are not significant in the exposure calculations. 
5.2 Future Research 
The results of the calculations show that "II is not the dominant isotope of 
radioiodine exposure rates.  "'I does not become the dominant isotope until 
approximately 36 hours after the release. The other isotopes of radioiodine need to be 
evaluated to determine there effects during a nuclear event. 54 
The Hanford tanks showed that 137Cs-137mBa decay chain was by far the most 
dominant isotope for the exposure rates.  These calculations need to be modified in the 
future when the tank inventories are known. 55 
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